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Introduction	  	  Thomas	  Piketty’s	  imposing	  volume	  has	  both	  brought	  serious	  economics	  firmly	  into	  the	  mainstream	  of	  public	  debate,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  thrown	  down	  the	  gauntlet	  to	  the	  economics	  profession,	  allegedly	  guilty	  of	  a	  ‘childish	  passion	  for	  mathematics	  and	  for	  purely	  theoretical	  and	  ideological	  speculation’	  (Piketty	  2014:	  32).	  But	  Piketty’s	  entreaty	  to	  his	  colleagues	  to	  ‘start	  with	  fundamental	  questions	  and	  try	  to	  answer	  them’,	  and	  indeed	  his	  contempt	  for	  ‘foolish	  disciplinary	  squabbles’	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  directed	  at	  political	  scientists.	  Certainly,	  no	  recent	  contribution	  by	  political	  scientists	  can	  claim	  to	  have	  made	  such	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  contemporary	  capitalism	  and	  the	  inequalities	  that	  characterize	  it.	  Indeed,	  political	  scientists	  have	  tended	  to	  neglect	  the	  role	  of	  inequality	  in	  political	  life,	  and	  broader	  debates	  on	  the	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  capitalism	  petered	  out	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Although	  Piketty’s	  denunciation	  of	  an	  increasingly	  mathematical	  economics	  detached	  from	  real	  world	  concerns	  is	  well	  taken,	  economists	  have	  in	  fact	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  study	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  recent	  period.	  Political	  scientists,	  in	  contrast,	  have	  been	  largely	  absent.	  But	  inequality	  is	  too	  important	  to	  be	  left	  to	  the	  economists,	  and	  political	  science,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  social	  sciences,	  can	  make	  an	  essential	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate.	  This	  article	  will	  develop	  this	  argument	  by	  first	  assessing	  and	  critiquing	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  political	  science	  and	  its	  account	  of	  contemporary	  capitalism,	  and	  then	  suggesting	  how	  Piketty’s	  thesis	  can	  be	  complemented,	  extended	  and	  challenged	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  politics	  and	  collective	  action	  shape	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  	  
Capitalism,	  Inequality	  and	  Political	  Science	  	  Economics’	  turn	  away	  from	  distributional	  questions	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  general	  equilibrium	  theory	  and	  its	  vision	  of	  freely	  contracting	  individual	  agents.	  The	  assumption	  that	  incomes	  from	  labour	  derive	  from	  individual	  marginal	  productivity	  essentially	  removed	  questions	  of	  distributive	  justice	  from	  the	  mainstream	  of	  economics.	  Models	  based	  on	  representative	  agents	  tended	  to	  elide	  the	  fundamental	  imbalances	  between	  high	  and	  low	  earners,	  and	  between	  owners	  of	  capital	  and	  sellers	  of	  labour.	  Alongside	  the	  role	  of	  the	  economics	  profession	  in	  training	  the	  managerial	  elite	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  countries	  and	  the	  conspicuous	  rewards	  offered	  to	  economists	  within	  the	  market	  system	  (Haring	  and	  Douglas	  2012),	  it	  could	  be	  said	  that	  economists’	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  inequality	  is	  overdetermined.	  	   Understanding	  political	  science’s	  relative	  neglect	  of	  inequality	  is	  rather	  more	  puzzling.	  One	  can	  speculate	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  political	  science	  as	  an	  institutionalized	  academic	  discipline	  in	  the	  1950s,	  a	  period	  of	  low	  inequality	  
marked	  by	  a	  confidence	  that	  Western	  mixed	  economies	  had	  resolved	  the	  central	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism,	  distracted	  from	  the	  historical	  importance	  of	  distributional	  tensions	  in	  driving	  political	  development.	  Piketty’s	  interpretation	  of	  Kuznets’	  famous	  curve	  as	  a	  ‘product	  of	  the	  Cold	  War’	  (Kuznets	  1955;	  Piketty	  	  2014:	  14),	  can	  be	  matched	  by	  similar	  developments	  in	  political	  science.	  The	  dominant	  ‘structural-­‐functionalist’	  theories	  of	  the	  emergent	  academic	  field	  of	  political	  science	  stressed	  the	  harmonious	  integration	  of	  various	  moving	  parts	  into	  a	  cohesive	  and	  stable	  ‘system’,	  rather	  than	  the	  conflict-­‐riven	  instability	  of	  the	  Marxist	  understanding	  of	  politics	  in	  a	  capitalist	  world	  (Blyth	  2006).	  Just	  as	  Kuznets	  predicted	  that	  inequality	  would	  decline	  as	  capitalism	  matured,	  the	  ‘modernization	  theorists’	  of	  political	  science	  saw	  economic	  development	  as	  a	  route	  to	  social	  peace	  and	  democratization,	  with	  the	  dominant	  middle	  classes	  entrenching	  the	  rational	  and	  cooperative	  resolution	  of	  (essentially	  manageable)	  social	  conflicts	  (Dahl	  1956,	  Lipset	  1960,	  Huntington	  1968).	  Where	  the	  working	  class	  made	  an	  appearance,	  it	  was	  as	  a	  willing	  participant	  in	  neocorporatist	  arrangements	  that	  institutionalized	  class	  cooperation	  (Schmitter	  and	  Lehmbruch	  1979).	  The	  replacement	  of	  the	  functionalist	  paradigm	  by	  rational	  actor	  theory,	  which	  became	  dominant	  in	  American	  political	  science	  by	  the	  1990s,	  has	  also	  been	  interpreted	  as	  an	  intellectual	  front	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  opened	  by	  ideologically	  motivated	  scholars	  (Amadae	  2003).	  It	  would	  be	  a	  simplification,	  but	  not	  an	  entirely	  misleading	  one,	  to	  summarize	  the	  mainstream	  of	  political	  science	  in	  its	  formative	  post-­‐war	  period	  as	  being	  underpinned	  by	  a	  broadly	  benign,	  even	  complacent,	  interpretation	  of	  capitalist	  democracy,	  neatly	  condensed	  in	  Francis	  Fukuyama’s	  (in)famous	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  book,	  The	  End	  of	  History	  and	  the	  Last	  Man	  (1992).	  There	  were	  of	  course	  many	  challenges	  to	  this	  mainstream	  view.	  In	  the	  US,	  critiques	  of	  the	  pluralist	  school	  focused	  on	  inequalities	  of	  access	  to	  political	  decision-­‐making	  (Schattschneider	  1960,	  Crenson	  1971).	  Scholars	  connecting	  to	  the	  Marxian	  tradition	  emphasized	  the	  essentially	  conflictual	  relations	  between	  capital	  and	  labour,	  and	  by	  implication,	  the	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  capitalist	  democracy,	  based	  on	  an	  awkward	  mix	  of	  equal	  voting	  rights	  and	  unequal	  property	  rights.	  Korpi	  (1983),	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  (1990)	  and	  others	  (Huber	  and	  Stephens	  2001,	  Brady	  2009)	  interpreted	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  and	  its	  assault	  on	  inequality,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  working	  class	  to	  mobilize	  its	  electoral	  strength	  and	  form	  alliances	  with	  other	  forces	  to	  secure	  redistribution.	  Indeed,	  whilst	  economics	  was	  ignoring	  inequality	  political	  scientists,	  alongside	  sociologists,	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  research	  into	  the	  effects	  of	  institutions	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  income,	  although	  the	  dearth	  of	  data	  meant	  that	  the	  dependent	  variable	  was	  often	  welfare	  spending	  or	  ‘decommodification’	  (Scruggs	  and	  Allan	  2006)	  rather	  than	  inequality	  as	  such.	  Much	  early	  work	  on	  voting	  behaviour	  adopted	  a	  class-­‐based	  perspective	  on	  electoral	  democracy	  (Lipset	  and	  Rokkan	  1967,	  Butler	  and	  Stokes	  1974,	  Przeworksi	  and	  Sprague	  1986),	  although	  by	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  the	  dominant	  approaches	  in	  the	  field	  of	  electoral	  studies	  –	  such	  as	  ‘issue’	  and	  ‘valence’	  voting	  –	  had	  essentially	  dropped	  class	  position	  as	  a	  relevant	  explanatory	  variable	  (see	  Evans	  1999).	  An	  important	  challenge	  to	  pluralism	  and	  modernization	  theory	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  capitalist	  class	  in	  postwar	  democracy,	  a	  debate	  animated	  largely	  by	  sociologists	  (Offe	  and	  Wiesenthal	  1980,	  Therborn	  1978,	  Poulantzas	  1976,	  Miliband	  1969)	  but	  which	  also	  saw	  important	  
interventions	  by	  political	  scientists	  such	  as	  Charles	  Lindblom	  and	  (again)	  Adam	  Przeworski.	  Lindblom’s	  analysis	  of	  capitalist	  systems	  (1977)	  viewed	  large	  capitalist	  corporations	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  democracy,	  and	  ‘the	  Market	  as	  Prison’	  (1982)	  he	  went	  further,	  suggesting	  that	  capitalists	  enjoyed	  the	  ‘automatic	  recoil	  mechanisms’	  of	  disinvestment	  and	  capital	  flight,	  that	  disciplined	  the	  working	  class	  without	  any	  need	  for	  the	  capitalist	  class	  to	  resort	  to	  conspiratorial	  acts	  or	  political	  organization.	  Przeworksi’s	  work	  with	  Michael	  Wallerstein	  (1982,	  1988)	  modelled	  the	  dynamics	  of	  class	  compromise	  between	  capital	  and	  labour,	  drawing	  quite	  different	  conclusions	  to	  Lindblom:	  that	  democratic	  capitalism	  could	  develop	  into	  a	  stable	  and	  mutually	  beneficial	  equilibrium,	  under	  certain	  specific	  conditions.	  With	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  the	  neo-­‐Marxist	  debate	  quickly	  lost	  relevance.	  Social	  class,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  capitalist	  elites,	  and	  the	  contradictions	  of	  capitalist	  accumulation	  disappeared	  from	  view.	  In	  political	  science,	  this	  entrenched	  a	  dominant	  scholarship	  concerned	  with	  formal	  political	  institutions	  such	  as	  executives	  and	  legislatures,	  political	  parties	  and	  competitive	  elections,	  or	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  often	  within	  a	  game	  theoretical	  framework,	  borrowing	  models	  of	  strategic	  behaviour	  and	  statistic	  analysis	  from	  economics	  (Green	  and	  Shapiro	  1994).	  Alternatives	  to	  the	  mainstream	  focused	  on	  identity	  politics	  and	  their	  related	  social	  movements,	  rather	  than	  the	  fundamental	  contradiction	  between	  labour	  and	  capital	  (Fraser	  1995).	  Canonical	  models	  such	  as	  the	  median	  voter	  theory	  of	  elections	  (Downs	  1957,	  Meltzer	  and	  Richard	  1981)	  were	  quite	  consistent	  with	  an	  essentially	  benign	  view	  of	  capitalist	  democracy	  as	  a	  system	  capable	  of	  rewarding	  and	  integrating	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  whose	  survival	  was	  not	  in	  doubt.	  With	  the	  partial	  exception	  of	  work	  on	  globalization	  within	  the	  field	  of	  international	  political	  economy,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  great	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007-­‐8	  political	  science	  appeared	  to	  have	  pretty	  much	  given	  up	  on	  fundamental	  critiques	  of	  capitalism.	  Instead,	  research	  on	  capitalism,	  class	  and	  inequality	  morphed	  into	  a	  rather	  more	  circumscribed,	  and	  at	  times	  defensive,	  scholarship	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  preserving	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  that	  had	  emerged	  in	  advanced	  democracies	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  (Ruggie	  1982’s	  ‘embedded	  liberalism’).	  The	  dominant	  paradigm	  of	  comparative	  political	  economy	  became	  historical	  institutionalism,	  which	  built	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  more	  sociological	  political	  economy	  to	  bring	  institutions	  back	  into	  the	  frame	  (Thelen	  and	  Steinmo	  1992).	  The	  historical	  institutionalist	  research	  agenda	  certainly	  had	  as	  its	  implicit	  focus	  the	  politics	  of	  class	  compromise,	  but	  took	  a	  less	  macro-­‐social	  approach	  to	  analysing	  the	  institutional	  dynamics	  of	  capitalism	  (Hall	  and	  Soskice	  2001,	  Thelen	  2004).	  Welfare	  state	  studies	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  new	  lines	  of	  cleavage	  beyond	  traditional	  class	  divisions	  (Lewis	  1992,	  Lynch	  2006,	  Rueda	  2007,	  Béland	  and	  Lecours	  2008).	  Research	  into	  trade	  unions	  and	  corporatism	  began	  to	  focus	  increasingly	  on	  the	  role	  of	  skills	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  globalization	  and	  technological	  change	  on	  the	  institutions	  of	  embedded	  liberalism	  (Boix	  1998,	  Garrett	  1998,	  Iversen	  2005,	  Kenworthy	  2008).	  The	  scholarship	  on	  political	  parties	  increasingly	  viewed	  them	  as	  part	  of	  the	  state	  machinery	  rather	  than	  representatives	  of	  class	  interests	  (Katz	  and	  Mair	  1995)	  and	  political	  participation	  was	  studied	  more	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  how	  to	  integrate	  
marginalized	  groups	  into	  the	  social	  mainstream	  than	  as	  a	  route	  to	  fundamental	  political	  change	  (Putnam	  2000).	  	  In	  short,	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millenium	  ‘class’	  had	  almost	  entirely	  disappeared	  from	  political	  science	  research,	  and	  income	  inequality	  was	  anything	  but	  centre	  stage.	  This	  lack	  of	  attention	  for	  class	  can	  certainly	  be	  in	  part	  attributed	  to	  the	  declining	  appeal	  of	  Marxist	  analysis	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,	  but	  there	  are	  other	  reasons	  too:	  professional	  envy	  of	  the	  ‘scientitic’	  status	  and	  methodological	  prowess	  of	  economists,	  and	  the	  highly	  American	  identity	  of	  political	  science	  as	  a	  discipline,	  probably	  also	  contributed	  (Steinmo	  2008).	  Whatever	  the	  reason,	  mainstream	  political	  science	  appeared	  mostly	  unconcerned	  about	  both	  the	  steady	  increase	  in	  inequality	  in	  advanced	  market	  economies,	  and	  particularly	  the	  spectacular	  growth	  of	  top	  incomes	  documented	  by	  Piketty	  and	  others.	  But	  when	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  hit,	  leading	  governments	  to	  bail	  out	  capital	  and	  largely	  pass	  on	  the	  bill	  to	  the	  wage-­‐earning	  population	  (Blyth	  2013),	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  inequality	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  ignored.	  	  	  
Bringing	  Inequality	  Back	  In:	  The	  Challenge	  to	  Political	  Science	  	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  irony	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  economics,	  the	  academic	  field	  which	  has	  been	  widely	  blamed	  for	  the	  unstable	  and	  unequal	  form	  of	  capitalism	  that	  has	  grown	  to	  dominate	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  (Haring	  and	  Douglas	  2012),	  should	  have	  also	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  research	  into	  rising	  inequality.	  Over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  or	  so	  economists	  have	  built	  on	  the	  work	  of	  pioneers	  such	  as	  Tony	  Atkinson	  to	  produce	  a	  rapidly	  growing	  body	  of	  work	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  in	  advanced	  democratic	  nations.	  Before	  
Capital	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  Piketty	  had	  been	  part	  of	  a	  group	  of	  economists	  working	  with	  Atkinson	  that	  published	  important	  work	  (Piketty	  and	  Saez	  2003,	  Atkinson,	  Piketty	  and	  Saez	  2011)	  documenting	  the	  rapid	  rise	  in	  the	  share	  of	  income	  accruing	  to	  the	  very	  top	  of	  the	  distribution.	  The	  OECD,	  often	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  vanguard	  of	  the	  push	  towards	  liberalization,	  had	  also	  published	  voluminous	  studies	  of	  inequality	  (2008,	  2011).	  The	  Luxembourg	  Income	  Study,	  involving	  sociologists	  and	  political	  scientists	  as	  well	  as	  economists,	  was	  crucial	  in	  building	  an	  infrastructure	  for	  work	  on	  the	  income	  distribution	  in	  advanced	  countries.	  But	  the	  bulk	  of	  new	  research	  on	  inequality	  has	  been	  produced	  by	  economics,	  and	  high	  profile	  economists	  such	  as	  Paul	  Krugman	  and	  Joseph	  Stiglitz	  	  have	  been	  instrumental	  in	  popularizing	  and	  publicizing	  these	  findings.	  Political	  science,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  been	  slow	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  baton.	  By	  focusing	  mainly	  on	  levels	  of	  public	  spending	  and	  the	  relative	  generosity	  of	  particular	  welfare	  programmes,	  scholars	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  have	  been	  slow	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  both	  the	  broader	  trend	  towards	  high	  levels	  of	  overall	  income	  inequality	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  spectacular	  growth	  of	  top	  incomes	  in	  particular.	  They	  have	  also	  tended	  to	  miss	  the	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  changes	  –	  so-­‐called	  ‘structural	  reforms’	  involving	  liberalization	  of	  markets	  and	  changes	  to	  employment	  rights	  –	  on	  the	  overall	  distributive	  picture.	  Again,	  the	  exception	  comes	  from	  a	  perhaps	  unexpected	  source:	  US	  political	  scientists	  working	  in	  the	  mainstream	  of	  American	  politics,	  a	  field	  normally	  associated	  with	  bone-­‐dry	  studies	  of	  voting	  behaviour	  or	  the	  interactions	  between	  elites	  in	  the	  three	  arms	  
of	  government,	  rather	  than	  any	  radical	  critique	  of	  American	  democracy.	  Reflecting	  no	  doubt	  the	  dramatic	  rise	  in	  the	  wealth	  and	  income	  at	  the	  top	  of	  US	  society,	  a	  number	  of	  well-­‐established	  American	  scholars	  have	  addressed	  the	  threats	  inequality	  poses	  to	  democracy.	  Larry	  Bartels	  has	  used	  survey	  research	  to	  show	  that	  the	  American	  public	  is	  both	  aware	  of	  inequality	  and	  uncertain	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  it,	  and	  also	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  gulf	  separating	  elite	  opinion	  from	  mass	  opinion	  on	  issues	  of	  economic	  justice	  (2005,	  2008).	  Scholars	  working	  on	  congressional	  voting	  behaviour	  have	  argued	  that	  economic	  inequality	  is	  driving	  an	  increasing	  polarization	  of	  party	  competition	  in	  the	  US	  (McCarthy,	  Poole	  and	  Rosenthal	  2006).	  Martin	  Gilens	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  American	  public	  policy	  systematically	  reflects	  the	  interests	  of	  wealthy	  groups	  rather	  than	  the	  citizenry	  as	  a	  whole	  (2012),	  and	  Jacob	  Hacker	  and	  Paul	  Pierson’s	  powerful	  book	  Winner-­‐
Take-­‐All	  Politics	  (2010)	  documents	  the	  various	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  wealthy	  interests	  subvert	  the	  policy	  process	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  showing	  that	  ‘predistribution’	  and	  ‘market-­‐making’	  can	  be	  as	  important,	  or	  more	  so,	  than	  patterns	  of	  redistribution	  in	  determining	  the	  changing	  shares	  of	  income	  between	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  population.	  However,	  inequality	  remains	  a	  minority	  interest	  of	  political	  scientists,	  and	  outside	  the	  US	  few	  political	  scientists	  have	  researched	  the	  politics	  of	  inequality	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  income,	  and	  even	  fewer	  the	  distribution	  of	  capital	  assets.	  Yet	  Piketty’s	  Capital,	  although	  clearly	  a	  work	  of	  economics,	  is	  also	  a	  very	  political	  book.	  True,	  the	  central	  thesis	  of	  the	  book	  is	  that	  capital’s	  share	  of	  national	  income	  will	  tend	  to	  rise	  unless	  economic	  growth	  exceeds	  the	  historic	  rate	  of	  return	  (r	  >	  g),	  but	  Piketty’s	  description	  of	  the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  capital	  in	  western	  countries	  over	  the	  past	  two	  centuries	  is	  replete	  with	  references	  to	  political	  institutions,	  trends	  and	  events,	  such	  as	  wars,	  empires,	  regime	  transformations,	  political	  movements	  and	  ideologies,	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  governments,	  parties,	  and	  elections.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Piketty’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  r	  and	  the	  description	  of	  trends	  in	  economic	  growth	  remain	  within	  the	  conceptual	  world	  of	  economics,	  with	  exogenous	  technology	  change	  and	  population	  growth	  carrying	  much	  of	  the	  explanatory	  burden,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  politics	  throughout	  the	  book.	  	  The	  political	  choices	  of	  whether	  governments	  should	  take	  ownership	  of	  capital,	  issue	  public	  debt,	  allow	  or	  restrain	  inflation	  and	  so	  on	  are	  a	  constant	  presence	  throughout	  Part	  Two	  of	  
Capital,	  lying	  beneath	  the	  broad	  sweep	  of	  impersonal	  economic	  forces	  it	  describes.	  So	  in	  short,	  although	  Capital’s	  principal	  message	  is	  that	  ‘capital	  is	  back’	  and	  that	  absent	  any	  active	  political	  interventions	  will	  continue	  to	  grow,	  Piketty	  also	  recognizes	  the	  political	  foundations	  of	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  capital	  through	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries.	  To	  a	  degree	  the	  book	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  political	  and	  social,	  as	  well	  as	  economic,	  history	  of	  this	  period.	  However	  the	  politics	  is	  only	  occasionally	  made	  explicit,	  as	  for	  example	  when	  he	  mentions	  French	  voters	  opting	  for	  a	  Socialist	  government	  in	  1981,	  ‘displaying	  a	  certain	  desire	  to	  sail	  against	  the	  wind’	  (p.139).	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  time	  it	  remains	  in	  the	  background,	  occasionally	  reemerging	  as	  ‘exogenous’	  shocks	  such	  as	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  World	  Wars,	  or	  in	  the	  ad	  hoc	  references	  to	  political	  institutions	  such	  as	  different	  taxation	  and	  welfare	  arrangements,	  or	  labour	  market	  regulations,	  that	  account	  for	  differences	  in	  inequality	  between	  advanced	  nations.	  Political	  scientists,	  of	  course,	  tend	  not	  to	  see	  political	  events	  as	  exogenous	  shocks,	  but	  as	  phenomena	  
worthy	  of	  explanation	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  To	  this	  extent,	  political	  science	  can	  not	  only	  complement	  and	  complete,	  but	  also	  challenge	  key	  aspects	  of	  Piketty’s	  thesis.	  	  	  
Politics,	  Institutions	  and	  Inequality:	  How	  Capital	  is	  Constructed	  by	  Politics	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  assumptions	  underpinning	  Piketty’s	  argument,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  one	  most	  questioned	  by	  critics	  so	  far,	  is	  the	  estimate	  of	  a	  historical	  rate	  of	  return,	  
r,	  that	  remains	  broadly	  constant	  across	  a	  range	  of	  quite	  different	  historical	  periods	  in	  which	  the	  economies	  studied	  have	  undergone	  root-­‐and-­‐branch	  transformations.	  It	  is	  this	  stability	  of	  r	  which	  drives	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  capital/income	  ratio,	  given	  that	  g	  (economic	  growth)	  is	  rather	  more	  variable,	  particularly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  demographic	  changes	  (the	  relatively	  narrow	  fluctuations	  in	  productivity	  growth	  charted	  by	  Piketty	  turn	  out	  to	  play	  a	  surprisingly	  limited	  role	  in	  explaining	  overall	  growth).	  As	  basic	  yet	  powerful	  models	  go,	  r	  >	  g	  is	  doing	  an	  awful	  lot	  of	  work,	  and	  indeed	  many	  economists	  have	  reacted	  skeptically	  (see	  Kervick	  2014	  for	  a	  summary).	  	   The	  political	  economy	  perspective	  would	  suggest	  another	  rather	  more	  fundamental	  critique	  however.	  As	  an	  economist,	  Piketty	  believes	  that	  market	  economies	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  underlying	  dynamic	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  concentration	  of	  capital	  independently	  of	  whatever	  political	  forces	  may	  be	  dominant.	  Politics	  can	  only	  come	  along	  to	  disturb	  this	  dynamic	  through	  large-­‐scale	  shocks	  such	  as	  wars,	  revolutions,	  democratic	  transitions	  or	  the	  pressure	  of	  radicalized	  organized	  labour.	  But	  in	  fact	  the	  political	  dimension	  goes	  much	  deeper:	  the	  very	  economic	  forces	  Piketty	  describes	  are	  embedded	  in	  institutional	  arrangements	  which	  can	  only	  be	  properly	  understood	  as	  political	  phenomena.	  Capital	  does	  refer	  to	  these	  arrangements	  on	  occasion,	  but	  they	  are	  far	  from	  centre	  stage.	  Yet	  in	  a	  sense	  capital	  itself	  –	  the	  central	  concept	  of	  the	  book	  –	  is	  almost	  meaningless	  without	  proper	  consideration	  of	  its	  political	  foundations.	  	   The	  key	  inspiration	  for	  such	  a	  critique	  is	  Karl	  Polanyi’s	  Great	  
Transformation	  (1957),	  an	  achievement	  whose	  extraordinary	  ambition	  and	  reach	  Piketty	  comes	  close	  to	  matching.	  Polanyi’s	  fundamental	  insight	  was	  that	  the	  market	  system,	  contrary	  to	  the	  ‘common	  sense’	  of	  our	  liberal	  age,	  was	  not	  a	  natural	  result	  of	  humans’	  innate	  propensity	  to	  barter	  or	  trade,	  but	  instead	  a	  political	  project	  driven	  by	  purposive	  actors,	  using	  all	  the	  political	  resources	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  ruling	  elites,	  including	  violent	  coercion.	  Of	  particular	  importance	  is	  Polanyi’s	  identification	  of	  the	  creation	  and	  formalization	  of	  property	  rights	  over	  the	  commons	  as	  a	  key	  building	  block	  of	  the	  market	  system.	  Land	  once	  given	  over	  to	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  for	  grazing	  and	  cultivation	  became	  private	  property,	  backed	  by	  state	  power.	  Polanyi’s	  description	  of	  the	  enclosures	  in	  late	  18th	  century	  England	  is	  a	  powerful	  example	  of	  how	  capital	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  assets	  with	  defined	  owners	  able	  to	  make	  claims	  on	  the	  resulting	  flow	  of	  income	  –	  is	  a	  political	  creation.	  To	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  r	  >	  g,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  politics	  of	  how	  r	  is	  allocated	  and	  the	  ownership	  of	  K	  is	  institutionalized	  and	  protected.	  The	  same	  insight	  underpins	  a	  more	  recent	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  property	  rights	  by	  Murphy	  and	  Nagel,	  who	  point	  out	  that	  ‘we	  are	  all	  born	  into	  an	  elaboratedly	  structured	  legal	  system	  governing	  the	  acquisition,	  exchange,	  and	  transmission	  of	  property	  rights,	  and	  ownership	  comes	  to	  seem	  the	  most	  natural	  
thing	  in	  the	  world’	  (2002:	  8).	  Murphy	  and	  Nagel’s	  book	  focuses	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  taxation	  and	  takes	  aim	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  some	  right-­‐wing	  ‘libertarians’	  that	  ownership	  can	  in	  some	  ways	  exist	  prior	  to	  the	  state	  apparatus	  which	  defines	  it,	  and	  which	  must	  be	  paid	  for.	  Piketty,	  of	  course,	  is	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  taxation,	  and	  advocates	  heavy	  taxation	  of	  some	  forms	  of	  capital	  as	  essential	  for	  capitalism’s	  survival	  (in	  Part	  Four).	  But	  by	  presenting	  income	  and	  wealth	  data	  in	  ‘pre-­‐tax’	  form,	  and	  explaining	  their	  dynamics	  in	  terms	  of	  broad	  market	  forces,	  he	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  understating	  the	  very	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  ownership	  of	  capital,	  and	  of	  the	  basic	  institutions	  of	  the	  capitalist	  order.	  The	  politics	  of	  property	  ownership	  underpin	  all	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  capital	  that	  Piketty	  analyzes.	  For	  example,	  land	  and	  real	  estate	  are	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  total	  capital	  throughout	  the	  periods	  discussed	  in	  the	  book;	  agricultural	  land	  was	  around	  half	  of	  total	  capital	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  in	  the	  countries	  studied,	  whilst	  housing	  has	  supplanted	  it,	  constituting	  close	  to	  half	  of	  total	  capital	  in	  the	  United	  State	  in	  2010	  (p.151).	  Yet	  although	  the	  value	  of	  agricultural	  land	  and	  of	  the	  buildings	  in	  which	  people	  live	  and	  work	  does	  reflect	  in	  part	  someone’s	  productive	  effort,	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  the	  value	  of	  land	  and	  real	  estate	  is	  allocated	  on	  non-­‐economic	  grounds:	  after	  all,	  at	  some	  point	  in	  its	  history	  all	  land	  was	  nobody’s	  property,	  and	  land	  itself	  can	  be	  neither	  produced	  (with	  few	  exceptions)	  nor	  transported.	  The	  allocation	  of	  initial	  property	  rights	  is	  more	  or	  less	  arbitrary	  from	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  the	  result	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  political	  process	  (often	  involving	  a	  resolution	  through	  violence).	  The	  subsequent	  trading	  of	  property	  rights	  is	  also	  highly	  politicized,	  with	  various	  regulations	  having	  major	  consequences	  for	  ownership.	  One	  way	  to	  illustrate	  these	  points	  is	  to	  cite	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Duke	  of	  Westminster,	  Gerald	  Grosvenor,	  who	  is	  the	  wealthiest	  individual	  in	  Britain,	  owing	  his	  fortune	  to	  lands	  that	  have	  been	  owned	  by	  his	  family	  for	  nine	  centuries.	  In	  the	  late	  1980s,	  the	  Duke	  resigned	  from	  the	  UK	  Conservative	  Party	  in	  protest	  at	  legislation	  introduced	  by	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  government	  which	  enhanced	  the	  rights	  of	  leasehold	  tenants	  to	  buy	  the	  freeholds	  of	  their	  properties,	  thus	  forcing	  him	  to	  sell	  many	  freehold	  titles1.	  We	  can	  only	  speculate	  whether	  his	  frustration	  at	  these	  changes	  was	  perhaps	  tempered	  by	  his	  membership,	  as	  a	  hereditary	  peer,	  of	  the	  Upper	  House	  of	  the	  Westminster	  Parliament,	  with	  voting	  rights	  that	  were	  only	  abolished	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  reform	  of	  1999.	  So	  even	  if	  the	  fact	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  may	  respond	  to	  an	  economic	  logic,	  the	  process	  is	  embedded	  in	  a	  very	  political	  logic.	  Piketty	  recognizes	  this,	  as	  is	  shown	  by	  his	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  inherited	  wealth	  and	  its	  threat	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  capitalist	  system.	  But	  the	  book	  rather	  understates	  the	  possibilities	  of	  using	  the	  regulation	  of	  property	  rights	  as	  a	  means	  of	  dealing	  with	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  capital,	  taking	  it	  as	  read	  that	  extremes	  of	  wealth	  inequality	  are	  an	  immutable	  fact	  of	  life.	  The	  distribution	  of	  real	  estate	  wealth,	  which	  has	  become	  a	  very	  visible	  source	  of	  extreme	  wealth	  inequality	  in	  Britain	  in	  recent	  years,	  is	  in	  large	  part	  an	  artefact	  of	  a	  series	  of	  political	  decisions	  regulating	  the	  ownership	  of	  land,	  the	  right	  to	  build	  on	  it,	  and	  the	  large	  variety	  of	  public	  interventions	  affecting	  the	  desirability	  of	  the	  place	  where	  each	  piece	  of	  land	  sits,	  including	  the	  fact	  that	  often	  public	  authorities	  built	  the	  buildings	  themselves.	  The	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  both	  private	  home	  ownership	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  social	  housing	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  was	  the	  result	  of	  specific	  political	  choices	  regarding	  planning	  permissions	  to	  build	  private	  housing,	  
decisions	  to	  use	  public	  money	  to	  build	  social	  housing	  and	  to	  subsidize	  rents,	  new	  rules	  imposing	  greater	  obligations	  on	  landlords,	  regulations	  restricting,	  but	  also	  subsidizing	  home	  loans,	  and	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  institutions	  and	  policies.	  	  The	  case	  of	  housing	  policy	  is	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  how	  government	  can	  use	  strategies	  of	  what	  Jacob	  Hacker	  (2013)	  has	  called	  ‘predistribution’	  to	  change	  the	  way	  markets	  are	  regulated	  to	  achieve	  greater	  equality,	  rather	  than	  simply	  taxing	  and	  redistributing	  through	  cash	  transfers.	  The	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  home	  ownership	  in	  post-­‐war	  Britain,	  and	  the	  replacement	  of	  private	  by	  public	  rented	  housing,	  was	  in	  large	  part	  the	  result	  of	  regulatory	  actions	  (although	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  element	  of	  fiscal	  redistribution	  too).	  The	  result	  was	  to	  provide	  the	  baby-­‐boomer	  generation	  in	  Britain	  with	  either	  secure	  public	  rented	  housing,	  or	  relatively	  cheap	  (and	  in	  part	  subsidized,	  through	  mortgage	  interest	  tax	  relief)	  privately	  owned	  housing.	  But	  policy	  shifts	  in	  the	  1980s	  reversed	  the	  trend:	  the	  Thatcher	  government	  not	  only	  ceased	  building	  social	  housing,	  it	  also	  encouraged	  local	  authorities	  to	  sell	  existing	  units	  to	  their	  tenants	  at	  knock-­‐down	  prices.	  Alongside	  a	  reluctance	  to	  address	  bottlenecks	  in	  the	  planning	  process	  which	  restricted	  the	  building	  of	  new	  homes	  for	  private	  buyers,	  this	  policy	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  both	  forcing	  real	  estate	  prices	  up	  as	  the	  population	  grew,	  and	  preventing	  new	  cohorts	  from	  enjoying	  the	  access	  to	  property	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  post-­‐war	  generation.	  In	  the	  recent	  period,	  private	  rentals	  have	  reemerged	  as	  a	  major	  form	  of	  tenancy	  for	  younger	  Britons,	  enriching	  buy-­‐to-­‐let	  landlords	  who	  are	  able	  to	  deduct	  mortgage	  interest	  payments	  as	  a	  business	  expense	  and	  enjoy	  wide	  freedom	  to	  raise	  rents	  and	  evict	  tenants.	  In	  short,	  political	  choices	  generated	  a	  very	  egalitarian	  distribution	  of	  residential	  property	  for	  several	  decades,	  but	  then	  policy	  shifts	  dictated	  an	  increasingly	  unequal	  allocation,	  which	  has	  mostly	  favoured	  wealthy	  groups.	  	  Political,	  rather	  than	  economic,	  analysis	  is	  needed	  to	  understand	  these	  developments.	  For	  example,	  the	  expansion	  of	  housing	  supply	  in	  post-­‐war	  Britain	  reflected	  a	  political	  consensus	  around	  public	  provision	  and	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole,	  backed	  by	  a	  suspicion	  of	  unfettered	  markets	  after	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  1930s	  and	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Labour	  party	  in	  mobilizing	  broad	  working	  class	  support.	  The	  rise	  of	  Thatcherism	  and	  the	  divisions	  within	  the	  Labour	  party	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  reflected	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  dominant	  political	  and	  economic	  ideas	  (Hall	  1989,	  Blyth	  2002)	  and	  a	  decline	  in	  working	  class	  organization	  (Rose	  and	  McAllister	  1986,	  Heath,	  Jowell	  and	  Curtice	  2001).	  These	  trends,	  although	  present	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  other	  countries,	  played	  out	  in	  a	  particularly	  dramatic	  fashion	  in	  the	  UK.	  Comparative	  political	  analysis	  is	  needed	  to	  explain	  why.	  A	  variety	  of	  alternative	  ways	  of	  allocating	  housing	  capital	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  other	  European	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  predominance	  of	  social	  or	  heavily	  regulated	  private	  renting	  in	  Northern	  Europe,	  or	  the	  family-­‐oriented	  capitalism	  in	  Southern	  Europe	  in	  which	  the	  informal	  economy	  and	  creative	  interpretations	  of	  property	  law	  (as	  well	  as	  redistributive	  agrarian	  reforms	  in	  the	  past)	  have	  led	  to	  widespread	  private	  home	  ownership.	  The	  broad	  trends	  in	  the	  share	  of	  housing	  capital	  in	  the	  economy	  may	  follow	  the	  patterns	  charted	  by	  Piketty,	  but	  institutional	  traditions	  and	  patterns	  of	  political	  mobilization	  in	  different	  countries	  can	  explain	  why	  the	  returns	  to	  this	  form	  of	  capital	  are	  allocated	  in	  more	  or	  less	  unequal	  ways.	  Housing	  inequality	  is	  above	  all	  a	  political	  phenomenon,	  and	  political	  power	  determines	  market	  outcomes	  to	  a	  large	  degree.	  	  
	  
The	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  the	  One	  Per	  Cent:	  Changing	  Politics,	  Changing	  
Capital	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  spectacular	  illustration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  politics	  in	  the	  growth	  and	  distribution	  of	  capital	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  financial	  markets.	  Piketty	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  his	  choice	  to	  measure	  capital	  in	  terms	  of	  wealth	  (the	  market	  values	  of	  assets	  at	  a	  point	  in	  time),	  rather	  than	  as	  factors	  of	  production	  (Solow	  2014),	  which	  can	  be	  measured	  in	  other	  ways	  (Silverberg	  2014).	  This	  definitional	  choice	  highlights	  once	  again,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  housing,	  the	  institutional	  foundations	  of	  inequality.	  Asset	  values	  fluctuate	  significantly	  over	  time	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  degree	  than	  economic	  growth,	  and	  although	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  over	  the	  long	  run	  such	  fluctuations	  wash	  out,	  leaving	  wealth	  roughly	  equivalent	  to	  productive	  capital,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  is	  unaffected.	  In	  fact,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  financial	  system	  determines	  claims	  on	  productive	  assets	  has	  major	  distributional	  consequences,	  and	  again	  we	  observe	  the	  role	  of	  political	  power.	  	   The	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007-­‐8	  provides	  us	  with	  some	  insights	  here.	  Although	  to	  a	  significant	  degree	  the	  collapse	  of	  markets	  in	  financial	  assets	  left	  the	  volume	  of	  real	  productive	  capital	  largely	  intact,	  there	  was	  the	  potential	  for	  major	  destruction	  of	  paper	  wealth	  had	  the	  financial	  sector	  not	  been	  bailed	  out	  by	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  advanced	  world.	  Of	  course,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  could	  have	  had	  caused	  catastrophic	  damage	  to	  the	  real	  economy	  (beyond	  the	  major	  damage	  that	  did	  in	  fact	  take	  place)	  which	  could	  have	  destroyed	  real	  productive	  capital.	  But	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  government	  interventions	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  conserving	  a	  range	  of	  existing	  property	  rights,	  the	  bailouts	  had	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth.	  The	  possibilities	  for	  different	  outcomes	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  comparing	  responses	  to	  the	  financial	  collapse	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  UK,	  the	  euro	  zone	  and	  Iceland.	  In	  the	  US,	  the	  TARP	  bailout	  simply	  handed	  over	  cash	  to	  troubled	  institutions,	  without	  any	  change	  in	  ownership.	  In	  the	  UK,	  there	  was	  bailouts	  of	  some	  institutions	  through	  state	  guarantees	  but	  also	  nationalizations	  of	  troubled	  banks,	  which	  brought	  ownership	  of	  assets	  into	  public	  control.	  In	  the	  euro	  zone,	  bailouts	  of	  sovereign	  debtors	  using	  cash	  from	  international	  organizations	  as	  well	  as	  European	  institutions	  had	  the	  indirect	  effect	  of	  bailing	  out	  banks	  in	  creditor	  countries	  (in	  Ireland,	  government	  panicked	  under	  EU	  pressure	  and	  bailed	  out	  failed	  banks	  itself,	  effectively	  bankrupting	  the	  state).	  Finally	  in	  Iceland	  major	  over-­‐leveraged	  institutions	  were	  simply	  allowed	  to	  fail,	  wiping	  out	  stockholders.	  	  The	  diverse	  distributional	  effects	  of	  these	  measures	  are	  clear,	  and	  what	  is	  also	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  decisions	  taken,	  although	  they	  had	  the	  character	  of	  emergency	  measures	  taken	  under	  duress,	  were	  eminently	  political.	  Who	  had	  the	  power	  to	  ensure	  that	  policy	  protected	  their	  interests	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  great	  turbulence?	  In	  the	  US	  policy	  reflected	  the	  tight	  connections	  between	  politics	  and	  Wall	  Street	  (the	  key	  policy-­‐maker	  Hank	  Paulson’s	  career	  taking	  him	  from	  Goldman	  Sachs	  to	  the	  US	  Treasury),	  which	  facilitated	  a	  bailout	  with	  no	  strings	  attached.	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  Labour	  government	  was	  certainly	  subject	  to	  heavy	  influence	  from	  the	  financial	  sector,	  but	  was	  sufficiently	  independent	  of	  it	  to	  socialize	  ownership	  of	  part	  of	  the	  banking	  system.	  In	  the	  eurozone	  policy	  reflected	  the	  overwhelming	  weight	  of	  Germany	  and	  France	  in	  the	  EU	  decision-­‐
making	  process,	  whilst	  the	  Irish	  bailout	  illustrated	  the	  incestuous	  relationship	  between	  elected	  politicians	  and	  real	  estate	  speculators.	  In	  short,	  diverse	  responses	  to	  a	  common	  set	  of	  problems	  (the	  basic	  logic	  of	  crisis	  –	  investor	  panic	  as	  over-­‐leveraged	  banks	  suddenly	  realized	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  losses	  –	  was	  similar	  across	  the	  cases)	  can	  only	  be	  properly	  understood	  by	  analyzing	  the	  power	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  different	  actors,	  power	  resources	  that	  did	  not	  solely	  reflect	  their	  economic	  clout	  (particularly	  since	  economic	  clout	  was	  itself	  subject	  to	  the	  decisions	  being	  taken).	  One	  could	  also	  go	  further.	  The	  politics	  of	  the	  crisis	  also	  reflected	  a	  great	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  as	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  market	  actors	  had	  to	  confront,	  at	  great	  speed,	  a	  set	  of	  largely	  unanticipated	  problems.	  This	  meant	  decision-­‐making	  under	  Knightian	  uncertainty,	  in	  other	  words	  where	  policy	  was	  subject	  to	  ‘unknown	  unknowns’	  in	  Donald	  Rumsfeld’s	  celebrated	  phrase.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  actors	  have	  no	  certain	  way	  of	  knowing	  where	  their	  interests	  lie	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  pre-­‐conceived	  templates	  for	  action	  rather	  than	  informed	  rational	  calculation	  (Blyth	  2003).	  An	  adequate	  explanation	  for	  action	  therefore	  requires	  that	  we	  go	  beyond	  a	  basic	  assessment	  of	  apparently	  self-­‐evident	  economic	  interests	  and	  power	  resources,	  to	  consider	  also	  the	  ideas	  and	  theories	  that	  govern	  political	  action.	  The	  subsequent	  evolution	  of	  policy	  after	  the	  immediate	  bailout	  events	  followed	  a	  pattern	  which	  could	  not	  have	  easily	  been	  predicted	  at	  the	  time	  and	  which	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  political	  battle	  in	  which	  changing	  power	  resources	  and	  changing	  interpretations	  of	  the	  situation	  produced	  a	  largely	  unanticipated	  outcome.	  When	  the	  financial	  collapse	  took	  place	  it	  was	  widely	  hailed	  as	  bringing	  to	  a	  close	  the	  neoliberal	  transformation	  which	  had	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  with	  the	  Thatcher-­‐Reagan	  revolutions	  (Krugman	  2009,	  Stiglitz	  2009,	  Posner	  2009).	  It	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  discrediting	  of	  neoliberal	  ideas	  by	  the	  abject	  failure	  of	  liberalized	  financial	  markets	  would	  hasten	  some	  kind	  of	  alternative	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  consensus,	  and	  the	  Keynesian	  measures	  that	  followed	  on	  from	  financial	  bailouts	  seemed	  to	  indicate	  that	  such	  a	  change	  was	  taking	  place	  (Skidelsky	  2010).	  But	  after	  little	  more	  than	  18	  months,	  policy	  quickly	  reverted	  to	  type,	  as	  policy	  flipped	  back	  to	  an	  emphasis	  on	  reducing	  fiscal	  deficits	  and	  securing	  the	  low	  inflation	  entrenched	  by	  independent	  central	  banks	  in	  the	  decade	  prior	  to	  the	  crash.	  By	  2010,	  Keynesianism	  was	  in	  retreat,	  and	  the	  only	  government	  interventions	  remaining	  involved	  central	  bank	  injections	  of	  funds	  into	  the	  financial	  markets	  to	  aid	  balance	  sheet	  reconstruction.	  In	  short,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  opponents	  of	  neoliberalism,	  the	  ‘crisis	  had	  gone	  to	  waste’	  (Mirowski	  2013),	  and	  the	  main	  political	  beneficiaries	  of	  crisis	  were	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  parties	  rather	  than	  the	  progressive	  centre-­‐left.	  	   Piketty’s	  work	  suggests	  a	  straightforward	  answer	  to	  this	  paradox:	  as	  capital	  grows	  in	  size	  relative	  to	  the	  economy,	  the	  holders	  of	  capital	  –	  the	  ‘one	  per	  cent’	  targeted	  by	  the	  Occupy	  movement	  –	  acquire	  ever	  greater	  political	  power	  and	  influence,	  allowing	  them	  to	  divert	  the	  policy	  process	  towards	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  assets	  as	  a	  first	  priority	  (Hacker	  and	  Pierson	  2010).	  However	  this	  raises	  as	  many	  questions	  as	  it	  answers.	  First	  of	  all,	  if	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  capital/output	  ratio	  is	  a	  common	  trend	  affecting	  all	  advanced	  democracies	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  why	  did	  policy	  responses	  vary	  across	  nations?	  Clearly	  some	  political	  institutions	  do	  a	  better	  job	  of	  constraining	  the	  power	  of	  capital	  than	  others	  (Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  2014),	  and	  this	  is	  not	  solely	  a	  function	  of	  the	  level	  of	  
income	  concentration.	  But	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  richest	  one	  per	  cent	  and	  its	  growing	  political	  influence	  begs	  another	  question:	  why	  does	  the	  remaining	  99	  per	  cent	  allow	  this	  to	  happen,	  given	  the	  overwhelming	  numerical	  superiority	  of	  those	  who	  own	  no	  or	  negligible	  capital?	  	   The	  unexpected	  failure	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  to	  seriously	  undermine	  the	  neoliberal	  settlement	  poses	  a	  fundamental	  question	  about	  the	  political	  consequences	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  capital	  described	  by	  Piketty.	  Certainly	  Piketty	  himself	  attributes	  great	  importance	  to	  twentieth	  century	  political	  trends	  such	  as	  the	  rise	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  labour	  movement,	  as	  well	  as	  wars,	  in	  explaining	  the	  temporary	  decline	  of	  capital	  (see	  Milanovic	  2014).	  But	  the	  theory	  of	  inexorable	  capital	  share	  in	  itself	  tells	  us	  little	  about	  its	  likely	  political	  effects.	  Piketty’s	  Part	  Four	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  proposals	  aimed	  at	  curbing	  growing	  inequality,	  but	  the	  likelihood	  of	  these	  proposals	  prospering	  depends	  on	  the	  political	  defeat	  of	  the	  owners	  of	  most	  capital	  by	  those	  that	  have	  less.	  What	  can	  political	  science	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  reform?	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  of	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  Of	  course	  the	  point	  that	  capitalism	  has	  political	  underpinnings	  and	  that	  policy	  will	  determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  r	  >	  g	  will	  lead	  to	  ever	  greater	  inequality	  is	  rather	  trivial	  unless	  we	  can	  provide	  some	  kind	  of	  political	  analysis	  that	  goes	  beyond	  what	  Piketty	  and	  other	  economists	  can	  tell	  us.	  Here	  political	  science	  as	  a	  profession	  faces	  a	  dilemma.	  The	  desire	  for	  greater	  rigour	  has	  led	  much	  of	  the	  mainstream	  of	  American	  political	  science	  in	  particular	  to	  adopt	  many	  of	  the	  tools	  of	  economics,	  such	  as	  game	  theory	  models,	  econometric	  analysis	  and,	  more	  recently,	  experimentalism.	  One	  problem	  with	  this	  trend	  is	  that	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  for	  political	  scientists	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  distinctive	  set	  of	  answers	  to	  social	  problems,	  since	  economists	  have	  long	  been	  active	  in	  applying	  their	  approach	  to	  political	  phenomena	  such	  as	  elections,	  legislatures,	  policy-­‐making,	  redistribution	  and	  so	  on.	  Yet	  the	  politics	  we	  observe	  in	  Piketty’s	  Capital	  is	  largely	  a	  set	  of	  given	  parameters	  that	  remain	  unexplained,	  and	  lack	  the	  formal	  rigour	  of	  his	  ‘fundamental	  laws’	  of	  capitalism.	  	  	   It	  is	  probably	  best	  not	  to	  aspire	  to	  a	  parallel	  set	  of	  simple	  equations	  that	  could	  explain	  long-­‐term	  political	  developments,	  but	  politics	  is	  not	  just	  noise	  that	  occasionally	  disrupts	  inexorable	  economic	  trends.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  examples	  of	  property	  rights	  and	  financial	  markets	  discussed	  earlier,	  politics	  is	  what	  allows	  capital	  accumulation	  to	  happen,	  and	  determines	  at	  least	  to	  some	  degree	  to	  whom	  capital	  returns	  are	  allocated.	  A	  circular	  theory	  of	  economic	  resources	  begetting	  political	  power,	  which	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  adopt	  when	  observing	  the	  political	  interventions	  of	  the	  wealthy,	  neglects	  the	  reality	  that	  the	  ‘99	  per	  cent’,	  when	  mobilized,	  can	  wield	  literally	  irresistible	  political	  power.	  We	  therefore	  need	  some	  kind	  of	  understanding	  of	  consent	  and	  dissent,	  of	  the	  political	  dynamics	  which	  determine	  why	  and	  when	  the	  non-­‐wealthy	  majority	  tolerate	  or	  react	  against	  capital	  accumulation.	  	   Economics	  is	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  and	  political	  science	  needs	  to	  avoid	  narrowing	  its	  scope	  if	  it	  is	  to	  perform	  any	  better.	  Much	  contemporary	  political	  economy	  research	  adopts	  an	  essentially	  structuralist	  approach	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  redistribution.	  Median	  voters	  vote	  for	  redistribution	  
because	  they	  are	  net	  beneficiaries,	  political	  parties	  will	  converge	  around	  the	  centre	  because	  that	  is	  where	  the	  median	  voter	  is,	  government	  will	  trade	  off	  the	  short-­‐term	  political	  benefits	  of	  redistribution	  against	  the	  long-­‐term	  benefits	  of	  growth,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  in	  fact	  what	  is	  striking	  about	  the	  longue	  durée	  of	  political	  action	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  backdrop	  to	  Piketty’s	  Capital	  is	  that	  it	  is	  rather	  more	  variable	  and	  aleatory.	  Just	  as	  politics	  brought	  revolution	  and	  war	  to	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  it	  then	  brought	  a	  set	  of	  benign	  institutions	  that	  allowed	  a	  spectacular	  improvement	  in	  the	  human	  condition	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  advanced	  countries	  of	  Western	  Europe	  and	  North	  America).	  We	  are	  now	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  deciding	  whether	  disruption,	  reform	  or	  stagnation	  constitute	  the	  response	  to	  current	  difficulties.	  The	  capital/output	  ratio	  is	  entirely	  indeterminate	  on	  this	  point.	  	   To	  conclude,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  propose	  two	  directions	  political	  science	  research	  can	  follow	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  
Capital.	  The	  first,	  already	  mentioned,	  is	  a	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  political	  and	  economic	  ideas	  structure	  the	  institutional	  framework	  in	  which	  capitalism	  operates.	  Piketty	  essentially	  dismisses	  ideas	  as	  epiphenomenal,	  arguing	  that	  his	  French	  compatriots	  who	  associate	  government	  interventionism	  with	  the	  economic	  growth	  of	  the	  trente	  glorieuses	  are	  deluded	  by	  the	  coincidence	  of	  a	  statist	  policy	  approach	  with	  a	  period	  in	  which	  reconstruction	  and	  demographic	  growth	  brought	  growing	  prosperity.	  It	  is	  hasty	  to	  dismiss	  these	  ideas,	  if	  only	  because	  the	  dramatic	  impact	  of	  Capital	  on	  our	  public	  debate	  suggests	  that	  ideas	  do	  matter,	  and	  that	  even	  if	  Piketty’s	  plans	  for	  new	  redistributive	  taxes	  do	  not	  come	  to	  fruition,	  the	  book	  has,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent,	  changed	  the	  terms	  of	  debate.	  Ideas	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  capital	  accumulation,	  especially	  when	  it	  results	  in	  such	  great	  inequality,	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  upholding	  the	  institutional	  order	  in	  which	  capitalist	  development	  unfolds.	  A	  narrowly	  economistic	  interpretation	  can	  tell	  us	  little	  about	  how	  this	  happens,	  but	  political	  science	  can	  draw	  on	  both	  qualitative	  empirical	  analysis	  and	  normative	  political	  theory	  to	  offer	  insights.	  	   The	  second	  direction	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  collective	  action.	  Much	  of	  the	  ‘institutionalist’	  research	  in	  both	  political	  science	  and	  indeed	  in	  economics	  sees	  institutions	  as	  crucial	  in	  explaining	  how	  the	  political	  economy	  develops	  (for	  example	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  2012).	  But	  a	  narrowly	  rational	  choice	  perspective	  has	  real	  trouble	  explaining	  how	  institutions	  are	  constructed,	  and	  indeed	  how	  they	  evolve	  over	  time	  (Bates	  1988).	  We	  can	  observe	  that	  collective	  action	  follows	  waves	  which	  track	  the	  key	  moments	  of	  inflection	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  last	  two	  centuries	  and	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  economy.	  The	  reasons	  for	  these	  variations	  in	  popular	  mobilization	  are	  little	  understood	  (Hirschman	  1982),	  but	  they	  are	  decisive	  –	  wars	  are	  not	  ‘exogenous	  shocks’	  but	  violent	  and	  destructive	  acts	  of	  collective	  politics.	  The	  process	  whereby	  large	  numbers	  of	  individuals	  become	  convinced	  of	  the	  need	  to	  act	  with	  others	  in	  the	  service	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  political	  goal	  has	  to	  be	  a	  priority	  for	  social	  science,	  and	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  form	  of	  capitalism	  Piketty	  describes	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  those	  who	  have	  no	  capital	  acquiesce	  or	  respond.	  	  	  *	  Thanks	  to	  the	  editors,	  and	  to	  Mark	  Blyth,	  Julia	  Lynch	  and	  Oyvind	  Skorge	  for	  their	  comments	  on	  earlier	  drafts	  of	  this	  article.	  
	  	  
Notes	  1	  With	  Westminster’s	  fortune	  estimated	  at	  £1.7	  billion,	  this	  particular	  regulatory	  change	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  have	  caused	  lasting	  damage;	  see	  Ane	  Treneman,	  ‘Profile:	  The	  Duke	  of	  Westminster.	  Private	  Property:	  Keep	  Out’,	  The	  Independent,	  1	  March	  1998.	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